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ABSTRACT
Recent work has introduced attacks that extract the architecture information of
deep neural networks (DNN), as this knowledge enhances an adversary’s capabil-
ity to conduct attacks on black-box networks. This paper presents the first in-depth
security analysis of DNN fingerprinting attacks that exploit cache side-channels.
First, we define the threat model for these attacks: our adversary does not need
the ability to query the victim model; instead, she runs a co-located process on
the host machine where the victim’s deep learning (DL) system is running and
passively monitors the accesses of the target functions in the shared framework.
Second, we introduce DeepRecon, an attack that reconstructs the architecture of
the victim network using the internal information extracted via Flush+Reload, a
cache side-channel technique. Once the attacker observes function invocations
that map directly to architecture attributes of the victim network, the attacker can
reconstruct the victim’s entire network architecture. In our evaluation, we demon-
strate that an attacker can accurately reconstruct two complex networks (VGG19
and ResNet50) having observed only one forward propagation. Based on the ex-
tracted architecture attributes, we also demonstrate that an attacker can build a
meta-model that accurately fingerprints the architecture and family of the pre-
trained model in a transfer learning setting. From this meta-model, we evaluate
the importance of the observed attributes in the fingerprinting process. Third, we
propose and evaluate new framework-level defense techniques that obfuscate our
attacker’s observations. Our empirical security analysis represents a step toward
understanding DNNs’ vulnerability to cache side-channel attacks. Our code is
available at: https://github.com/Sanghyun-Hong/DeepRecon.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become an essential tool in various applications, such as face
recognition, speech recognition, malware detection, and autonomous driving or aviation (Parkhi
et al., 2015; Amodei et al., 2016; Arp et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Smolyanskiy et al., 2017). A
DNN’s performance depends widely on the network architecture—the number and types of layers,
how the layers are connected, and the activation functions—and, unfortunately, there is no univer-
sal architecture that performs well on all tasks. Consequently, researchers and practitioners have
devoted substantial efforts to design various DNN architectures to provide high performance for
different learning tasks.
Owing to their critical role, DNN architectures represent attractive targets for adversaries who aim to
mount DNN fingerprinting attacks. In such an attack, the adversary probes a DNN model, considered
∗Indicates equal contribution.
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confidential, until she infers enough attributes of the network to distinguish it among other candi-
date architectures. In addition to revealing valuable and secret information to the adversary, DNN
fingerprinting can enable further attacks on black-box models. While the prior work on adversarial
machine learning often assumes a white-box setting, where the adversary knows the DNN model
under attack, these attacks are usually unrealistic in practice (Suciu et al., 2018). In consequence,
researchers have started focusing on a black-box setting, where model architecture is unknown to the
adversary. However, in this setting, the adversary often makes some assumptions about the victim
model in order to craft successful adversarial examples (Papernot et al., 2017). Instead of approxi-
mating, the adversary can start by conducting a DNN fingerprinting attack to infer the information
required about the model, then use this information to craft adversarial examples that can evade the
model. This can also enable model extraction attacks (Trame`r et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016;
Wang & Gong, 2018) and membership inference or model inversion attacks (Shokri et al., 2017;
Long et al., 2018).
Because of the large number and types of architectural attributes, and the subtle effect that each
attribute has on the model’s inferences, DNN fingerprinting is challenging when using the typi-
cal methods employed in the adversarial machine learning literature. For example, Wang & Gong
(2018) propose a hyperparameter stealing attack that requires knowledge of the training dataset, the
ML algorithm, and the learned model parameters, yet is unable to extract the model architecture.
Wang et al. (2018) demonstrate a fingerprinting attack against transfer learning; however, they rely
on the assumption that the teacher model and learning parameters are known to the attacker. To over-
come these challenges, recent work has started to investigate attacks that utilize information leaked
by architectural side-channels on the hardware where the DNN model runs. Hua et al. (2018) ex-
tract the network architecture of a model running on a hardware accelerator by monitoring off-chip
memory addresses. Yan et al. (2018) reduce the search space from 1035 to 16 candidates within a
given network architecture by exploiting cache side-channels.
In this paper, we ask the question: how vulnerable are DNNs to side-channel attacks, and what infor-
mation do adversaries need for architecture fingerprinting? We perform, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first security analysis of DNNs operating in the presence of cache side-channel attacks.
Specifically, we define the threat model for these attacks, including the adversary’s capabilities and
limitations. We then introduce DeepRecon, an efficient attack that reconstructs a black-box DNN
architecture by exploiting the Flush+Reload (Yarom & Falkner, 2014) technique, and we further
evaluate the importance of specific architectural attributes in the success of fingerprinting. Finally,
we propose and evaluate new framework-level defenses against these attacks.
Our attack works by targeting lines of code corresponding to the execution of specific network ar-
chitecture attributes of a deep learning (DL) framework. Specifically, these lines of code correspond
to instructions to execute functions that are mapped into the instruction cache when the functions
are invoked. Once these lines of code are identified, our attack flushes them from the instruction
cache shared by the attacker and the victim. The attacker waits for the victim’s process to run and
then measures the time it takes to re-access those same lines of code. If the victim’s DNN model
has accessed any of these particular functions, the corresponding lines of code will be present in
the instruction cache when the attacker tries to re-access them. Therefore, the access time to call
these functions will be measurably faster than if the victim had not loaded them back into the shared
instruction cache. On the other hand, if the victim DNN model did not access these particular func-
tions, the corresponding lines will not be present in the cache when accessed by the attacker, and
thus the access time will be measurably slower. We show that from this seemingly small amount of
information that is leaked to the attacker, much of the victim’s DNN architecture can be extracted
with no query access required. To launch this attack, we only assume that: 1) an attacker and a
victim are co-located in the same machine, and 2) they use the same shared DL framework.
In evaluations, we demonstrate that, by learning whether or not specific functions were invoked dur-
ing inference, we can extract 8 architecture attributes across 13 neural network architectures with
high accuracy. Based on the extracted attributes, we demonstrate how an attacker can reconstruct the
architectures of two common networks, VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) and ResNet50 (He
et al., 2016) as proof of concept. We also demonstrate a useful example of DeepRecon through
model fingerprinting in a transfer learning attack. Finally, we propose countermeasures to obfuscate
an attacker from extracting the correct attributes and sequences using observation attacks like Deep-
Recon and show that these defenses significantly increase the errors in the extracted attributes and
can be implemented in various DL frameworks without hardware or operating system support.
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2 BACKGROUND
As opposed to attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in software or algorithm implementations, side-
channel attacks utilize information leaks from vulnerabilities in the implementation of computer
systems. Due to modern micro-processor architecture that shares the last-level cache (L3 cache)
between CPU cores, cache side-channel attacks have become more readily available to implement.
Since the cache is involved in almost all the memory access activities on a machine, it can be a
medium that includes abundant information about programs running on the host. The fundamental
idea of the attack is to monitor the access time to the shared contents, e.g., shared libraries or
credentials, between a victim and an attacker while the attacker fills the cache set with the addresses
known to her (Prime+Probe (Liu et al., 2015)) or keeps flushing the shared data from the cache
(Flush+Reload (Yarom & Falkner, 2014)). In both the cases, once the victim accesses memory or
shared data, the attacker can identify which memory addresses or shared data is accessed. Prior work
has demonstrated that, with cache side-channels, an attacker can construct covert channels between
processes, stealing cryptographic keys, or breaking the isolation between virtual machines (Zhang
et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015).
FLUSH+RELOAD
Our attack leverages the Flush+Reload technique, which monitors accesses to memory addresses
in shared contents. The technique assumes that an attacker can run a spy process on the same host
machine. This enables the attacker to monitor the shared data or libraries between her and the victim.
During monitoring, the attacker repeatedly calls the clflush assembly instruction to evict the L3
cache lines storing shared content and continually measures the time to reload the content. A fast
reload time indicates the data was loaded into the cache by the victim whereas a slow reload time
means the data is not used. From this information, the attacker determines what data is currently
in use and identifies the control flow (order of function calls) of the victim’s process. We chose
Flush+Reload over Prime+Probe since the results from Flush+Reload produce less noise.
ATTACKS ON BLACK-BOX DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
Prior work has proposed various methods to attack black-box DNNs. Trame`r et al. (2016) and Pa-
pernot et al. (2017) demonstrated model extraction attacks on black-box DNNs that aim to learn a
substitute model by using the data available to the attacker and observing the query results. Fredrik-
son et al. (2015) and Shokri et al. (2017) demonstrated model inversion attacks on black-box DNNs
that reveal a user’s private information in the training data leveraging model predictions. Wang &
Gong (2018) proposed a hyper-parameter stealing attack that aims to estimate the hyper-parameter
values used to train a victim model. However, these attacks require unrealistic conditions, e.g., the
architecture of the victim network needs to be known to attackers, or the victim uses a network with
simple structures, such as multi-layer perceptrons. Thus, the capability of DeepRecon attack that re-
constructs black-box DNN architectures can bridge the gap between the realistic black-box scenario
and their conditions.
RECONSTRUCTING BLACK-BOX DNNS VIA SIDE-CHANNELS
Recent studies have discovered various methods to extract the architecture of a black-box DNN.
Memory and Timing Side-Channels: Hua et al. (2018) monitored off-chip memory accesses to
extract the network architecture of a victim model running on a hardware accelerator. They esti-
mated the possible architecture configurations and extracted model parameters. However, the attack
requires physical accesses to the hardware, whereas our attack does not.
Power Side-Channel: Wei et al. (2018) demonstrated that an attacker can recover an input image
from collected power traces without knowing the detailed parameters in the victim network. How-
ever, this approach also assumed an attacker who knows the architecture of a victim network, so our
attack could help meet the assumptions of this attack as well.
Cache Side-Channel: Concurrent work by Yan et al. (2018) demonstrates that an attacker can reveal
the architecture details by reverse engineering and attacking generalized matrix multiply (GeMM)
libraries. However, GeMM-based reverse engineering can only reveal the number of parameters
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of convolutional or fully connected layers because others such as activation and pooling layers are
difficult to characterize by matrix multiplications. Also, in order for the monitored functions in
GeMM libraries to be in a shared instruction cache of an attacker and a victim, the multiplications
must occur on the CPU. However, DeepRecon can be performed independent of the hardware on
which the computations occur, generalizing better common hardware on which DNNs run (e.g.,
GPUs).
Using Known Student Models: Wang et al. (2018) proposed a transfer learning technique in which
an attacker identifies teacher models by using known student models available from the Internet.
This approach assumed that the victim selects the teacher from a set of known architectures. We,
however, take this a step further and fingerprint families of architectures as well as many commonly
known teacher models. Additionally, we are able to reconstruct arbitrary teacher model architectures
with high accuracy.
Meta-Models: Oh et al. (2018) demonstrated that an attacker can estimate the victim’s architecture
by using a brute-force approach and meta-models. They first trained all the possible architectures of
a given set and pruned the models with inferior performance. Then, they trained a meta-model that
identified the network architecture using mutated samples and labels. However, the pruning process
is time intensive (i.e., 40 GPU days for 10k candidates of LeNet (LeCun, 1998)), and the candidates
were selected from limited architectural choices, whereas we again go a step further in identifying
families of architectures and can generalize to previously unknown teacher models.
3 DEEPRECON ATTACK
3.1 THREAT MODEL
Our threat model requires an attacker who can launch a co-located user-level process on the same
host machine as the victim. This ensures the attacker and the victim’s process share the same in-
struction cache. This co-location also allows our attacker to observe the victim DNN’s behavior
without actively querying the model, avoiding the common assumption of query access in the liter-
ature on black-box attacks. Consider the example of any computer that an attacker has access to at
a user-level, the attacker can log into this machine and attack other users with DeepRecon. Another
way for an attacker to achieve co-location is to disguise her process as a benign program such as an
extension for a browser. Once some victims install the extension in their browser, the attacker can
easily launch a monitoring process. We also assume that the attacker and victim use the same open-
source DL frameworks shared across users. Importantly, this assumption can be easily met because
many popular DL frameworks such as Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2016) or PyTorch1 are provided as
open-source libraries, and this practice of sharing libraries across users is default on major operat-
ing systems, e.g., Windows, MacOS, and Ubuntu. Thus, our attacker can identify the addresses of
functions to monitor in the instruction cache by reverse-engineering the shared framework’s code.
Motivating Attack Example: We provide a practical example where our threat model is applicable.
Suppose an attacker aims to install malware on a victim’s machine where an anti-virus system, based
on a DNN model, is running. To evade malware detection in common black-box attacks such as the
attack proposed in Ilyas et al. (2018), an attacker needs to drop crafted programs actively to monitor
the model’s decisions and synthesize an evasive sample based on the collected data. However, when
the attacker drops multiple files, her behavior can be detected by the victim. This is further amplified
by the need to query the model repeatedly to craft any more malicious files.
On the other hand, our attacker induces the victim to install a chrome add-on (which runs at a user-
level) that passively monitors cache behaviors of the model and extracts the architecture. Then,
the attacker trains a surrogate model with public datasets (including malware and benign software).
With the surrogate model, the attacker crafts her malware that evades detection and can continue to
craft malicious files that will be classified as benign offline and without any further observations. As
opposed to common black box attacks, our attacker lowers the possibility of being caught because
she only monitors the victim model while it is in use and does not need to query the model.
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Figure 1: DeepRecon Visualization. During forward/backward propagation, the victim DNN
model computes the prediction using the functions in the DL framework [(1), (2), (3), (4)]. Since the
attacker and victim share an instruction cache, the attacker can invalidate the cache lines that store
the functions [a)], and then monitor if the victim calls these functions by measuring the access time
[b), c)]. Based on the mapping between the functions and the architecture attributes, the attacker
reconstructs the architecture of the victim’s DNN [d), e)].
3.2 ATTACK OVERVIEW
The overview of DeepRecon attack is described in Fig. 1. The victim’s behaviors are depicted with
the dotted lines (black), and the attacker’s actions are described with the solid lines (red). While
preparing the attack offline, the attacker first analyzes the deep learning framework that the victim
uses and collects the target functions corresponding to the architecture attributes that the attacker
wants (Table 1). Then later, the attacker launches a co-located process at the user-level that runs
along with the victim’s process on the same host machine. When the victim’s process runs training
or predictions with its model, the target functions are invoked and the instructions that call them
are loaded into the shared instruction cache. The attacker periodically flushes the cache lines and
measures the access time to the target instructions. If the victim invokes any of the target functions
after flushing, the following access time measured by the attacker will be measurably faster than if
the victim does not invoke them. The attacker collects the number and sequence of invocations and
then extracts the victim model’s architecture attributes. Then, the attacker reconstructs the victim
model’s architecture.
3.3 REVERSE ENGINEERING
In Table 1, we analyze the TensorFlow v1.9.0-rc0 framework2 and list the target functions corre-
sponding to the architecture attributes. We choose TensorFlow due to its popularity as an open
source machine learning (ML) framework, but believe that the methods we describe will be appli-
cable to most, if not all, other popular frameworks. In addition to having found some corresponding
functions in another popular framework, PyTorch/Caffe2, our attack leverages the inherent structure
of a scalable and widely deployable ML framework, namely library layer abstraction. All the of
the functions we monitor in TensorFlow are in the core of the library, both below the API interface
and above the system dependent code. Because of this, our attack not only does not depend on the
specific TensorFlow API a victim uses but also is agnostic to the type of processing hardware the
victim is using, from a single CPU to a cluster of GPUs.
The specific functions we monitor in Table 1 represent two subgroups: those corresponding to con-
trol flow and those corresponding to architecture attributes. The control flow functions allow us to
1https://pytorch.org
2https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases/tag/v1.9.0-rc0
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Type Code Stage Func. Name Location in TensorFlow Code
Control
Flow
#queries T/I RunCallable() core/common runtime/session ref.cc [line: 154]
#grads T compute() core/kernels/bias op.cc [line: 218]
Arch.
Attributes
#convs T/I operator() core/kernels/conv ops.cc [line: 122]
#fcs T/I compute() core/kernel/matmul op.cc [line 451]
#softms T/I compute() core/kernels/cwise ops common.h [line: 240]
#relus T/I compute() core/framework/numeric op.h [line: 58]
#mpools T/I compute() core/kernels/pooling ops common.h [line: 109]
#apools T/I compute() core/kernels/avgpooling op.cc [line: 76]
#merges T/I compute() core/kernels/cwise ops common.h [line: 91]
#biases T/I compute() core/kernels/bias op.cc [line: 98]
(Note that T stands for the training, and I indicates the inference.)
Table 1: Target Functions. The monitored functions in the TensorFlow framework (v1.9.0-rc0).
Each function corresponds to a control flow or an attribute. [Note that the codes are the number of
queries (#queries), gradient updates (#grads), convolutional layers (#convs), fully connected layers
(#fcs), softmaxs (#softms), ReLUs (#relus), max poolings (#mpools), avg. poolings (#apools), merge
operations (#merges), bias operations (#biases).]
observe the number of queries the victim makes to the model and the number of layers that are up-
dated by gradient decent if we observe the model when it is being trained The function that monitors
the number of queries is especially important, as it allows us to separate individual observations.
The architecture attribute functions are called once per instance of an architecture attribute being
present in the neural network, allowing us to see the number of each attribute and the sequence in
which they occur in the victim’s architecture. Combined, these functions allow us to observe the
architecture attributes of a neural network from start to finish on a given observation.
Additionally, the bias operator gradient function, given in the table by #grads, can allow an attacker
to figure out the total number of layers that are updated during training time if the attacker observes
the training of the model. Using this information, the attacker, already knowing the total number
of layers in the architecture, can find the point at which the victim is freezing the backpropagation.
This allows the attacker to know which layers are directly inherited from the training model and
which layers are specifically trained by the victim. The relevance of this will be discussed in our
application of DeepRecon to model fingerprinting (Sec. 4).
Limitations. Similar to concurrent work (Yan et al., 2018), we are also able to extract additional
information, such as the number of parameters in convolutional and fully connected layers by mon-
itoring the matrix multiplications in the Eigen library3 on which TensorFlow is built. This attack
provides more fine-grained information, but it does not generalize to computations on hardware
other than a CPU. Also, we examine whether our attack can recover the inputs to the model and
its parameters. By varying inputs and parameters while monitoring the functions used to compute
these parameters using a code coverage tool, GCOV4, we find that the framework implements ma-
trix multiplications of parameters in a data-independent way. Thus, we are unable to estimate the
inputs and parameters of a victim model. We hypothesize that this is a general limit of cache based
side-channel attacks on DNNs that target instructions, and that obtaining the parameters is reducible
to the problem of reading arbitrary victim memory.
3.4 EXTRACTING ARCHITECTURE ATTRIBUTES
We run our attack on Ubuntu 16.04 running on a host machine equipped with the i7-4600M processor
(8 cores and 4MB L3 cache). Our victim and attacker processes are running at the user-level on the
same operating system (OS). Both the processes utilize the TensorFlow v1.9.0-rc0 framework. The
3http://eigen.tuxfamily.org/index.php
4https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Gcov.html
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Arch. Data Attributes Errors
#convs #fcs #softms #relus #mpools #apools #merges #biases
VGG19
G 16 3 1 18 5 0 0 19 -
S 16.2 3 1 18 5 0 0.6 18.7 1.1/62
L 16.3 3 1 18 4.9 0.1 1.6 18.8 2.3/62
ResNet50
G 53 1 1 49 1 1 16 50 -
S 54.7 1 1 48.9 0.9 1.1 15.9 49.8 2.3/173
L 54.5 1 1 48.9 1.1 1 16 49.8 2.9/173
(Note that G, S, and L means Ground truth, and the observations from Short and Long attacks.)
Table 2: Observed Architecture Attributes of VGG19 and ResNet50. We consider the 8 attributes
extracted from short and long attacks. In the short attacks, We report the average values observed in
ten random queries whereas the long attacks include the averages of ten continuous queries.
victim uses the DNN model to make predictions, and the attacker launches the Flush+Reload attack
using the Mastik toolkit (Yarom, 2016) to monitor the target functions at the same time.
A total of 13 convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures are considered in our experiment:
DenseNet121, 169, 201 (Huang et al., 2017), VGG16, 19 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), ResNet50,
101, 152 (He et al., 2016), InceptionV3, InceptionResNet (Szegedy et al., 2015), Xception (Chollet,
2017), MobileNetV1, and MobileNetV25 (Howard et al., 2017).
Table 2 includes the extraction results from monitoring VGG16 and Resnet50. The full extraction
results from the 13 networks are in Appendix D. We first show the results from a Short attack, where
an attacker can only run her process on a short interval of time, observing only a single query of the
network. We randomly choose ten individual queries and average the attributes. We report errors as
the sum of absolute deviations from ground truths. In VGG19, our attacker has 2.6 errors on average
and 3.1 in ResNet50. We also show the extraction results from 10 continuous observations (L), in
which the attacker runs her process for a more extended period of time. The error rates in both the
networks are similar. These results demonstrate that DeepRecon achieves better accuracy by only
observing a running network than prior work that assumes query access (Oh et al., 2018).
3.5 RECONSTRUCTING THE ARCHITECTURE OF BLACK-BOX DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
(a) ConvNet (VGG) (b) Identity (ResNet) (c) Residual (ResNet)
Figure 2: Basic Building Blocks of VGG and ResNet Architectures. The feature extractor of a
CNN is composed of basic building blocks. We describe the blocks used in VGGs and ResNets.
(Note that we exclude the normalization layers from each figure.)
Based on the extracted architecture information, DeepRecon reconstructs the entire DNN architec-
ture of the victim model. In these examples, we focus on the fact that most CNN architectures consist
of the feature extractor and classifier layers. The feature extractor is located in the earlier layers and
is the combination of basic building blocks. The classifier is a set of fully connected layers at the
end of the network. In VGGs and ResNets, there are standard blocks used in each CNN architecture
as we depict in Fig. 2. Each block includes activation layers with preceding convolutional layers. In
the classifier layers, each fully connected layer is followed by an activation layer.
We describe the reconstruction process of ResNet50 in Table 3. (Note that we also reconstructed
VGG16 without errors and show the result in Appendix A.) In this table, we compare the compu-
tation sequences observed by the attacker with the actual computations in ResNet50. We can see
5Note that we use alpha = 1.0 for both.
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the sequences are accurately captured with a few errors. The three steps at the bottom describe the
reconstruction processes of our attacker. Our attacker first identifies (1) the number of blocks by
counting the (max-)pooling layers. Once the attacker separates blocks with the pooling layer loca-
tions, she counts (2) the number of convolutional layers in each block. In ResNets, we know that the
Residual block has four convolutional layers, and the Identity block has three convolutional layers
in each. Thus, the attacker can identify the type of each block. After that, the attacker estimates
(3) the number of fully connected layers at the end. Finally, with this block-level information, our
attacker successfully estimates the victim architecture is the ResNet50 with high accuracy.
Arch. Data Computations Sequences (Layers in the Ground Truth)
ResNet50
G
CR PM CR CR C C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR
CR CR C C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR
CR CR C C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR
CR CR C C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR PA FSo
S
CR PM C CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR
C CR CR C MR CR CR ... MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR
C CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR R CR C MR
C CR CR C MR CR CR C MR CR CR C MR PA FSo
Recon. Steps Details
ResNet50
Recon.
(1)
Block 1. Block 2. Block 3 Block 4.
Block 5. Block 6. Block 7. Block 8.
Block 9. Block 10. Block 11. Block 12. Block 13. Block 14.
Block 15. Block 16. Block 17. Block 18.
(2)
Input Residual Block Identity Block Identity Block
Residual Block Identity Block Identity Block Identity Block
Residual Block Identity Block Identity Block Identity Block Identity Block Identity Block
Residual Block Identity Block Identity Block Fully Connecteds
(3) ResNet 50: Configuration with 50-Layers
(Note that C,P ,F ,M indicate the Convolutional, Pooling, Fully connected, Merge
layers, and the subscripts mean the activations (R: ReLU and So: Softmax).)
Table 3: Reconstruction Process of ResNet50 Architecture. We list the computation sequences
captured by our attack in the above rows and the reconstruction process at the bottom rows. The
errors in capturing the correct computation sequences by our attacker are marked as bold and red.
Discussion about the Reconstruction Errors. We also examine whether the errors in our exper-
iments have specific patterns, allowing our attacker to filter them out. However, we could not find
any pattern: the types and locations of error attributes are different in each run (over 10 runs). Thus,
we attribute these errors to two primary causes. First, there can be background noise from other
processes that our Flush+Reload attack picks up, e.g., a process can pull data into the L3 cache and
evict the target function between when the victim calls the function and we reload it. In this case,
our attacker cannot observe the victim calling the function. Second, our attack can experience com-
mon errors associated with the Flush+Reload attack (Yarom & Falkner, 2014), e.g., a victim invokes
the target function when we reload, causing our attacker to see a cache miss instead of correctly
observing a cache hit.
4 FINGERPRINTING BLACK-BOX NEURAL NETWORKS
Our attacker identifies victim neural network architectures using statistical models trained on the
attributes as features and the architectures as labels. This is a powerful capability to have if our at-
tacker aims to fingerprint the architecture of the pre-trained models used in transfer learning. Trans-
fer learning is typically done in a fine-tuned manner: a user creates a student model that uses the
architecture and parameters of a teacher model and trains only a few fully connected layers at the
end of the network by freezing the backpropagation of the preceding layers. We also found that our
attacker can learn the layers in the student model not updated during training when they observe the
training process (Sec. 3.3). Thus, our attacker can extract both the network architecture and frozen
layers of the student (victim) model.
Once our attacker identifies the victim network’s teacher model with this information, the attacker
can utilize several pre-trained models available from the Internet to perform further attacks. For in-
stance, an attacker can increase the success rate of black-box attacks by crafting adversarial samples
with the internal representation from the teacher models (Wang et al., 2018). Additionally, since
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Task Networks Acc. [Avg.] Important Attributes
Total - 1.0 [0.9046] #relus [0.2575] #merges [0.2534] #convs [0.2497] #biases [0.1034]
Family - 1.0 [0.9938] #relus [0.4621] #convs [0.4421] #mpools [0.3382] #apools [0.2752]
Arch.
Variants
V 1.0 [0.9867] #relus [0.6982] #convs [0.6982] #biases [0.6898] -
R 1.0 [0.9900] #relus [0.6399] #merges [0.6399] #convs [0.6399] #biases [0.3750]
D 1.0 [0.9867] #relus [0.6399] #merges [0.6399] #convs [0.6100] -
I 1.0 [1.0000] #convs [0.6399] #merges [0.6399] #apools [0.5875] #biases [0.3373]
M 1.0 [1.0000] #relus [0.6982] #convs [0.6982] #fcs [0.6595] #softms [0.6228]
(Note that V, R, D, I, and M indicate VGGs, ResNets, DenseNets, InceptionNets, and MobileNets.)
Table 4: Fingerprinting Performance and Important Attributes. Each row corresponds to each
task. We list the accuracy of the best classifiers and the essential attributes based on the MI scores,
denoted by the numbers in brackets.
adversarial samples transfer across different models for the same task (Trame`r et al., 2017), the at-
tacker is not required to use the exact same teacher model—i.e., she can use any pre-trained model
of an architecture family that achieves similar accuracy on a task. An attacker can also perform
model extractions easily. This is because the model parameters from the pre-trained models can be
readily found on the Internet as well and are used in a victim model in this setting. Finally, if the
attacker has a partial knowledge of the victim’s training data and can gain the knowledge of which
layers were frozen during training (see Sec. 3.3), she can fully estimate the parameters of the entire
network by independently training the last few layers that were not frozen.
To evaluate our fingerprinting attack, we train decision tree classifiers on the 13 networks used in
Sec. 3.4 to identify the network architectures using the extracted attributes and labels. We extract the
attributes over 50 observations of each network (650 in total) and utilize 5-fold cross-validations. We
measure the classification accuracy and analyze the four most essential attributes based on mutual
information (MI) scores. Since the attributes are not affected by the host machines or operating
systems, the attacker can train the models offline for use in attacks.
Table 4 shows the results of fingerprinting the neural networks. We conduct three types of classi-
fication tasks with the aim of identifying 1) the entire 13 networks, 2) 5 network families, and 3)
architecture variants in each network6. We report the accuracy of best decision trees and the aver-
age accuracy over the cross-validations. In all the tasks, our decision trees achieve 100% accuracy,
which demonstrates, once trained, these statistical models can be perfect predictors. (Note that we
also visualize our data in an attribute space via PCA analysis in Appendix C). We also identified
the four essential attributes across all the classifications: 1) #relus, 2) #merges, 3) #convs, and 4)
#apools. Identifying these influential attributes can guide a potential obfuscation-based defensive
strategy against such side-channel attacks.
5 DEFENSES TO DEEPRECON ATTACK
Previous studies on defenses against cache side-channel attacks (Kong et al., 2013; Zhou et al.,
2016) require specific hardware (page-locked cache) or kernel-level features (page coloring). These
solutions have not been widely deployed or have remained as optional features because of their
impact on computational performance. Hence, we propose framework-level defenses that do not
require specialized hardware or kernel-level updates. Our findings in Sec. 4 regarding the essential
architecture attributes for an attack, e.g., #relus, #convs, and #merges, guide our search for defenses.
As a result, we propose obfuscating the attacker’s observations of these attributes. We show that
these defenses significantly reduce the success of our DeepRecon attack, and they can be extended
to protect against a more general class cache side-channel attacks against DL frameworks.
5.1 RUNNING DECOY PROCESSES WITH TINY MODELS
DeepRecon and other potential cache side-channel attacks on deep learning frameworks can only
observe that a library function is called, but not by whom. By running an extra process (i.e., a decoy
6In the task 3), we consider MobileNet and MobileNetV2 as the same family.
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Network Arch. Attributes Errors Time
#convs #fcs #softms #relus #mpools #apools #merges #biases
ResNet50 - 54.5 1 1 48.9 1.1 1 16 49.8 2.9 17.88
ResNet50
+ TinyNets
C:1 368.75 1.05 1.05 47.05 0.95 1.00 687.75 347.80 1282.40 23.79
C:1 R:1 360.00 1.15 1.15 394.00 1.00 1.00 675.95 350.80 1612.05 23.85
C:2 R:2 M:1 414.55 1.00 1.00 715.10 1.10 1.00 782.25 468.25 2211.25 26.26
Table 5: Effectiveness of the Decoy Process. We compare the 8 attributes extracted from 10 runs,
average errors, and average time with and without TinyNets. Note that C refers to the number of
convolutional layers, R refers to the number of relu activation layers, and M refers to the number of
merge layers.
process) simultaneously with the actual process, we develop a simple but effective defensive strategy.
The decoy process also invokes the target functions in the shared framework, which obfuscates the
architecture attributes and computation sequences. To minimize the computational overhead, we
utilize networks that only have a few layers, referred to as TinyNets. To evaluate our defense, we
train these TinyNets at the same time as the victim’s process is running ResNet50, and we measure
the number of errors in the extracted attributes. The results are listed in Table 5. We experiment
with three TinyNets: 1) only with a Conv. layer (C:1), 2) Conv. with a ReLU layer (C:1, R:1), and
3) two Conv. and ReLU layers with a Merge layer.
We found the existence of a decoy process significantly hinders the attacker’s ability to extract
correct attributes, causing 1283-2211 errors in the attribute extractions. Contrasted with up to 2.9
errors on average from DeepRecon’s previous extractions (Section 3.4), we find that this defense is
exceedingly effective at curbing this type of reconstruction attack. We also show that we can increase
the errors associated with the attributes that we aim to obfuscate. For instance, when we run the
TinyNet with only one convolutional layer, we observe the #convs is significantly increased. This is
important because, with our defenses, a defender can choose the attributes to obfuscate. Since the
defender can control what noise gets introduced, they can also dynamically and adaptively change
what noise is added into the attackers observations, thereby increasing our defenses effectiveness and
generalizability. To quantify the overhead required of this defense, we measure the average network
inference time with and without a decoy process, and we observe that the defense increases the
inference time by only 5.91-8.38 seconds per inference. Thus, this defense is a reasonable measure
to combat cache side-channel attacks that reconstruct DNNs.
5.2 OBLIVIOUS MODEL COMPUTATIONS
Another defense against DeepRecon is to obfuscate the order and number of the computations (i.e.,
function invocations) observed by our attacker using oblivious model computations. We propose
two approaches. First, we can update the victim’s architecture by adding extra layers. To minimize
the side-effects such as performance loss, these layers return the output with the same dimensions
as the input. For instance, the convolutional layer with kernel size 3, padding size 1, and strides of
length 1 can preserve the input dimensions, and the identity block of the ResNets preserves this as
well. Thus, we augment the original architecture by adding such layers at the random location to
make the same architecture look different in the attacker’s point of view.
Prior work (Targ et al., 2016) has shown the unraveled view of the ResNet architecture. Under this
view, the skip-connections of a network can be expressed as the ensemble of multiple computational
paths that can be computed independently. Hence, we try splitting a computational path with skip-
connections into multiple paths without skip-connections. In forward propagation, the multiple
paths are randomly chosen and computed so that our attacker finds it difficult to capture the exact
architecture. To evaluate our intuition, we construct the obfuscated architecture of ResNet50 (see
Appendix B) and extract the attributes by using our attack. Our results are shown in Table 6.
Using this defense, the errors detected by DeepRecon increased from 2-3 to 28 for ResNet50. Dur-
ing this test, the first 3 blocks over the entire 16 blocks of ResNet50 are obfuscated. While less
effective than our previous defense, we conclude that this defense still can marginally obfuscate the
observations of our attacker. Additionally, the gain on computational time is also small: it only
increased from 17.88 to 24.03 seconds.
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Arch. Data Attributes Errors Time
#convs #fcs #relus #softms #mpools #apools #merges #biases
ResNet50 G 53 1 1 49 1 1 16 50 - 17.88S 64.80 1 1 57 1 1 20.3 54.9 29/173 24.03
(Note that G, and S means Ground truth and Short attack.)
Table 6: Extracted architecture attributes with Obfuscated ResNet50. We obfuscated the first 3
blocks (i.e., Residual, Identity, and Identity blocks) of the ResNet50 architecture.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper conducts the first in-depth security analysis of DNN fingerprinting attacks that exploit
cache side-channels. We first define the realistic threat model for these attacks: our attacker does not
require the ability to query the victim model; she runs a co-located process on the machine where
the victims DL system is running and passively monitors the accesses of target functions in a shared
framework. We also present DeepRecon, an attack that reconstructs the architecture of a victim
network using the architecture attributes extracted via the Flush+Reload technique. Based on the
extracted attributes, we further demonstrate that an attacker can build a meta-model that precisely
fingerprints the architecture and family of the pre-trained model in a transfer learning setting. With
the meta-model, we identified the essential attributes for these attacks. Finally, we propose and
evaluate new framework-level defense techniques that obfuscate our attackers observations. Our
empirical security analysis represents a step toward understanding how DNNs are vulnerable to
side-channel attacks.
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APPENDIX
A RECONSTRUCTION OF VGG16 ARCHITECTURE
Arch. Data Computations Sequences (Layers in the Ground Truth)
VGG16 G CR CR P CR CR P CR CR CR P CR CR CR P CR CR CR P FR FR FSoS CR CR P CR CR P CR CR CR P CR CR CR P CR CR CR P FR FR FSo
Recon. Steps Details
VGG16
Recon.
(1) Block 1. Block 2. Block 3. Block 4. Block 5. -
(2) ConvNet (2) ConvNet (2) ConvNet (3) ConvNet (3) ConvNet (3) Fully Connected
(3) VGG16: ConvNet Configuration ‘C’, ‘D’
(Note that C,P ,F indicate the Convolutional, Pooling, Fully connected layers,
and the subscripts mean the activation functions (R: ReLU, and So: Softmax).)
Table 7: Reconstruction Process of VGG16 Architecture. We list the computation sequences
captured by our attack above and the reconstruction process at the bottom.
We describe the reconstruction process of VGG16 in Table 7. The upper table indicates the se-
quences that our attacker captured, and the bottom shows the actual reconstruction steps. Our at-
tacker identifies the basic building blocks by splitting the sequence with pooling layers. Then, the
attacker counts the number of convolutional layers in each block. In VGG16, we found the first two
ConvNet blocks have two convolutional layers, and the next three ConvNet blocks have three con-
volutional layers in each. Additionally, the attacker estimates the number of fully connected layers
attached at the end. Once the attacker recovers all the blocks, our attacker can identify the victim
architecture as being VGG16 with the ConvNet configuration ‘C’ or ‘D’.
B OBFUSCATED RESNET50 ARCHITECTURE
Figure 3: Unraveled View of the First Three Blocks in ResNet50. The first three blocks in the
original ResNet50 are in the upper diagram, and we unravel them as the architecture at the bottom.
In Sec. 5.2, we construct the obfuscated ResNet50 architecture by using the unraveled view of
the first three blocks in ResNet50 as shown in Fig. 3. The upper architecture depicts the block
connections in the original ResNet50. In this network, the blocks are computed sequentially, e.g.,
Residual Block→ Identity Block→ Identity Block. However, in our unraveled architecture at the
bottom, there are individual 8 paths that can be computed independently. We use this architecture
to compute the blocks as follows: Residual Block 1, 2→ Identity Block 1→ Residual Block 3, 4
→ Identity Block 2 → Identity Block 3. This makes our attacker have difficulty in estimating the
architecture attributes and computation sequences of ResNet50.
C VISUALIZING CLUSTERS OF NEURAL NETWORKS IN ATTRIBUTES SPACE
In Fig. 4, we clearly see that each network forms a distinct cluster in the attribute space. Also,
the networks of the same family, e.g., VGGs, DenseNets, MobileNets, has the clusters close to
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Figure 4: Attribute space visualization of 13 networks. To visualize, we perform a principal
component analysis (PCA) of the 13 architecture attributes with 650 samples.
#convs #fcs #softms #relus #mpools #apools #merges #biases
PCA-0 0.6715 -0.0032 0.0005 0.6294 -0.0077 0.0023 0.3891 -0.0378
PCA-1 -0.3857 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.1383 -0.0239 -0.0422 0.8599 -0.3006
Table 8: The scores of 8 attributes in each principal axis. The first axis (PCA-0) is influenced by
#convs > #relus > #merges, and the second axis (PCA-1) varies with #merges > #convs > #relus.
each other. Table 8 compares the influence scores of each axis. We found that the three attributes
discussed in Sec. 4 are the most influential in the two axes.
D ATTRIBUTES EXTRACTION RESULTS FROM OTHER NETWORKS
We show the attributes extraction results with the other 11 networks in Table 9.
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Arch. Data Attributes
#convs #fcs #softms #relus #mpools #apools #merges #biases
VGG16
G 13 3 1 15 5 0 0 16
S 13.0 3.0 1.0 15.0 4.9 0.1 0 16.0
L 13.1 3.0 1.0 15.0 4.9 0.1 0 16.0
ResNet101
G 101 1 1 97 1 1 32 1
S 106.9 1.2 1.0 96.9 1.1 1.0 98.7 1.0
L 107.2 1.2 1.0 96.9 1.1 1.0 98.7 1.0
ResNet152
G 155 1 1 150 1 1 50 1
S 164.3 1.1 1.1 150.7 1.1 1.0 151.7 1.0
L 164.3 1.1 1.1 150.7 1.1 1.0 151.7 1.0
DenseNet121
G 120 1 1 121 1 3 58 1
S 125.4 1.0 1.3 119.7 1.0 3.2 59.3 1.0
L 125.5 1.0 1.3 119.7 1.0 3.2 59.3 1.0
DenseNet169
G 168 1 1 169 1 3 82 1
S 174.6 1.0 1.2 167.8 0.9 3.3 83.0 0.9
L 175.0 1.0 1.2 167.8 0.9 3.2 83.0 1.0
DenseNet201
G 200 1 1 201 1 3 98 1
S 203.1 1.1 1.1 199.6 1 3.1 99.0 1.0
L 203.1 1.1 1.1 199.6 1.2 3.1 99.0 1.0
InceptionV3
G 94 1 1 76 4 9 15 1
S 86.9 1.1 1.0 62.9 3.9 9.0 14.7 1.1
L 86.9 1.1 1.0 62.9 3.9 9.0 14.7 1.1
InceptionResNet
G 244 1 1 203 4 1 83 40
S 234.0 1.0 0.9 186.4 4.0 1.1 84.2 40.5
L 234.0 1.0 0.9 186.4 4.0 1.1 84.2 40.5
Xception
G 41 1 1 36 4 0 - 1
S 41.1 1.0 1.0 35.0 4.0 0 41.5 1.0
L 41.3 1.0 1.0 34.9 4.0 0 41.4 1.0
Mobile (1.0)
G 15 0 0 27 0 0 - 1
S 15.3 0 0 26.8 0 0 28.3 1.0
L 15.3 0 0 26.8 0 0 28.4 1.0
MobileV2 (1.0)
G 35 1 1 34 0 0 - 1
S 35.4 1.0 1.1 34.7 0.1 0 53.3 1.0
L 35.4 1.0 1.1 34.7 0.1 0 53.2 1.0
(Note that G, S, and L means Ground truth, and the observations from Short and Long attacks.)
Table 9: Extracted architecture attributes of the 11 networks. We consider the 8 attributes
extracted from short and long attacks. In the short attacks, we report the average values observed in
ten random queries, whereas in the long attacks, we report the averages of ten continuous queries.
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